ELECTRONIC TAGGING: IS THE SYSTEM PROVIDING THE SAFEGUARDS THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN PROMISED?
Part 4 of 12 | Catch a Thief UK National Justice Investigation
Electronic monitoring is playing an increasingly important role in criminal justice. But a new independent inspection has identified serious weaknesses in how monitoring information is shared, how alleged breaches are handled and how effectively the technology is integrated into probation supervision.
When someone is fitted with an electronic tag, what assurance does that provide to the public?
The answer depends on more than the device itself. The equipment must be fitted and activated correctly. The monitoring system must provide reliable information. Potential breaches must be assessed, relevant agencies must communicate effectively, and appropriate action must follow.
If any part of that process fails, the existence of a tag alone cannot guarantee that a court order or licence condition is being enforced as intended.
On 29 October 2026, HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services published a joint inspection examining electronic monitoring in England and Wales. The report identified serious gaps in guidance, information-sharing, record-keeping and the use of monitoring data.
It also reported that, on 30 June 2026, 5,043 people who should have been subject to electronic monitoring were not being monitored. That figure requires careful interpretation: it does not mean that all 5,043 people had deliberately removed a tag, tampered with equipment or absconded. The inspection found that the group included different circumstances, including people in custody, people whose medical conditions prevented monitoring and people awaiting operational action or unavailable when fitting staff attended.
The findings raise important questions about the reliability of the wider system, particularly as electronic monitoring becomes more prominent in community sentences, bail conditions and post-release supervision.
This is not a claim that electronic tags are useless. It is an examination of whether the systems and procedures surrounding them are delivering the safeguards the public expects.
Primary source: HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Electronic monitoring in practice, published 29 October 2026.
From prison overcrowding to electronic monitoring
This is the fourth instalment in Catch a Thief UK's 12-part investigation into early prisoner release, prison capacity, probation and public protection.
Each article examines a different part of the criminal justice system.
Article 1 Is early prisoner release really solving prison overcrowding?
We examined whether early release provides a sustainable answer to pressure on prison places, and why the consequences for the wider justice system also need to be considered.
Article 2 Early prisoner releases: how many breach their conditions, and what happens next?**
We examined licence breaches, recalls to custody and electronic monitoring concerns, distinguishing between a breach of conditions, an allegation of further offending and a conviction.
Article 3 Probation under pressure: can Britain safely supervise more offenders in the community?
We explored official evidence of staffing shortages, workload pressures and the challenges facing the Probation Service.
Article 4 Electronic tagging: is the system providing the safeguards the public has been promised?
This instalment examines what electronic monitoring can do, where independent inspectors have identified weaknesses and what needs to improve as its use expands.
The connection is important. If more people are managed in the community, electronic monitoring may form part of the arrangements used to enforce conditions or manage risk. But its effectiveness depends on the quality of the wider system.
What the new independent inspection found
The joint inspection published on 29 October 2026 examined two areas:
- How police forces respond to alleged breaches of electronically monitored bail conditions.
- How the Probation Service uses electronic monitoring for community sentences and post-release licences.
Inspectors reviewed 21 alleged electronic-monitoring bail-breach cases across two police forces. They also inspected 180 probation cases across six probation delivery units in six regions, alongside interviews, focus groups and other evidence.
The report recognised that dedicated police officers, staff and probation practitioners were working hard to respond to growing demand. It also identified improvements in regional electronic-monitoring teams, including stronger oversight and governance.
However, inspectors found significant weaknesses.
National guidance for police responses to electronically monitored bail breaches was limited, and practices varied between the forces examined. In the cases reviewed, alleged breaches did not consistently lead to a structured consideration of risks to victims, witnesses or the wider public.
Poor record-keeping and information-sharing also made it difficult for police forces to understand the volume of work generated by electronic monitoring and assess the effectiveness of their responses.
Within probation, inspectors found that monitoring data was not always fully integrated into supervision and rehabilitation. Practitioners sometimes had to navigate multiple technologies, systems and communication channels, while the information available was not always used to its full potential.
These are findings about the cases and organisations examined by inspectors. They should not be interpreted as proof that every police force or probation team responds inadequately to monitoring alerts.
Nevertheless, the inspection identifies weaknesses that the responsible agencies need to address.
The figure of 5,043: what does it actually mean?
One of the report's most striking findings is that 5,043 people who should have been subject to electronic monitoring were not being monitored on 30 June 2026.
It would be misleading to describe every one of these cases as a person deliberately evading monitoring.
The inspection explains that the category included different circumstances. These included people in custody, people with medical conditions preventing monitoring, cases awaiting operational action and people who were unavailable when fitting officers attended.
The figure therefore represents a gap between the monitoring requirement and monitoring being in place, rather than a verified count of deliberate tag tampering or people who had absconded.
That distinction does not make the finding unimportant. It raises a separate question: why did monitoring requirements remain outstanding, how quickly were those cases resolved, and did the responsible agencies have reliable information about each person's circumstances?
Inspectors found that answering even basic questions about who was being monitored, who remained unassigned equipment and why required substantial manual work across different datasets.
The absence of one reliable, accessible source of information makes it harder for managers to establish the true position, identify delays and maintain confidence that monitoring arrangements are operating as intended.
The central issue is not simply how many people were unmonitored. It is whether the authorities could reliably identify those cases, understand why they occurred and resolve them promptly.
A warning from the National Audit Office
The new inspection follows a report by the National Audit Office (NAO), published on 10 July 2026, titled *Electronic monitoring: improving resilience to meet increasing demand.
The NAO concluded that electronic monitoring had expanded but was not yet operating as intended. It identified weaknesses in governance, data quality, performance oversight and accountability across the system.
Its findings included delays in fitting equipment, problems with the timely communication of potential breaches and difficulties ensuring that monitoring information was accurate and useful.
The NAO reported that, in February 2026, Serco met its target for the timeliness of fitting visits, but equipment was successfully fitted to only 62% of the individuals visited within the permitted two attempts.
This distinction matters. A target measuring whether a visit happened on time does not necessarily tell us whether the intended monitoring was successfully established.
The NAO also identified delays in the reporting of breach information. Under the arrangements it examined, the contract did not require breach details to be provided to officials until 29–53 hours after a breach occurred.
That is a contractual reporting timeframe identified in the report. It should not be interpreted as proof that every breach notification was delayed by that amount, or that every delayed notification resulted in harm.
The report also found that the system needed to improve its ability to manage future demand. The Ministry of Justice had forecast that changes to sentencing and other arrangements could increase the number of people requiring monitoring.
The NAO's wider message was clear: expanding electronic monitoring without addressing weaknesses in the supporting systems risks making an already complicated service harder to manage.
Electronic tags do not all do the same job
The term “electronic tagging” is often used as if every device performs the same function. In practice, different technologies are designed for different monitoring requirements.
Radio-frequency curfew monitoring
Radio-frequency devices can be used to monitor compliance with a curfew at a specified address and during specified hours. They do not provide the same kind of continuous location information as GPS monitoring.
GPS location monitoring
GPS-enabled devices can provide location information, subject to the equipment, service and conditions in use. Depending on the order or licence, this may help monitor exclusion zones, movements or other location-related requirements.
Alcohol monitoring
Alcohol-monitoring devices are used to monitor compliance with relevant alcohol-related requirements. They are not simply location trackers and do not, by themselves, establish whether someone has committed another criminal offence.
The purpose and capabilities of each device matter when assessing whether it is suitable for a particular case.
A tag may provide useful evidence about compliance with a specific condition, but it does not independently assess every aspect of a person's behaviour or risk. Nor does it replace professional judgement, police investigation or probation supervision.
Source: Ministry of Justice, *Electronic Monitoring Statistics Publication, England and Wales: June 2026.
Monitoring alerts: what happens after a possible breach?
A monitoring alert is not necessarily proof that a criminal offence has occurred. The meaning of an alert depends on the device, the condition being monitored and the circumstances.
The authorities may need to establish whether the information is accurate, whether the relevant condition has been breached, what risks may arise and what action is appropriate.
The new joint inspection found that police forces faced substantial and increasing demand arising from electronically monitored bail conditions. Yet limited guidance and inconsistent recording practices made it difficult for the forces examined to assess the volume and nature of their responses.
Inspectors also found that the information provided to police could contain inaccuracies, requiring officers to carry out validation checks before making decisions.
The report noted that inspectors could not determine what enforcement action, if any, had been taken in the majority of the alleged bail-breach cases examined because of limitations in the available records.
This is an important finding, but it needs to be stated precisely: inspectors could not establish the action taken from the records available to them. That does not prove that no action occurred.
The report also highlighted the potential for large numbers of notifications to create additional work for police, especially as the use of electronic monitoring expands.
Inspectors recommended clearer guidance, improved recording and scrutiny, better information-sharing and a review of the rules governing which alleged breaches generate notifications to police.
The aim should be to ensure that alerts are assessed consistently and that police resources can be directed appropriately, particularly where victim safety or public protection may be at stake.
Victims must not be overlooked
Electronic monitoring can be used in circumstances where restrictions are intended to help protect victims, witnesses or members of the public.
That makes communication important. Victims may need accurate information about relevant bail conditions and decisions that affect their safety.
The joint inspection found that victims were not always informed about the outcomes of bail hearings. Inspectors reported that witness care staff in the two forces examined described cases where victims were not routinely updated when hearings did not result in a material change to bail conditions.
The report also noted the context of high workloads in witness care units and repeated court delays, which can increase the demand on staff responsible for keeping victims informed.
The finding should not be exaggerated into a claim that all victims were left without information. It does, however, identify a weakness in communication that needs to be addressed.
A monitoring system can only contribute to effective safeguarding if relevant information reaches the people and agencies who need it. Victims should not be left to assume that a tag guarantees their safety or that an alert will automatically result in a particular response.
The appropriate protections will depend on the individual circumstances, the conditions imposed and the decisions made by the relevant authorities.
Is monitoring being used effectively by probation?
The inspection found that regional electronic-monitoring teams had strengthened oversight, but that the technology was not always fully integrated into probation supervision and rehabilitation.
Practitioners sometimes received large volumes of information without having the time, systems or confidence needed to make the best use of it. In some cases, access to location data involved requesting information from a provider rather than reviewing it directly.
This matters because the value of monitoring is not limited to recording whether a condition has been followed. Where appropriate and authorised, information may also help practitioners understand behaviour, identify patterns and inform discussions about risk and rehabilitation.
However, monitoring should be proportionate and relevant to the individual case. It should not be assumed that every person requires the same device or level of monitoring.
Inspectors also found that the use of electronic monitoring was not always supported by sufficiently clear analysis of its intended purpose. The report identified opportunities to improve how practitioners consider whether monitoring is appropriate, how it relates to offending-related factors and how it fits into the wider sentence or licence plan.
In 67% of the inspected cases, inspectors judged that pre-sentence advice and information were sufficiently analytical, individualised and informative to support judicial decision-making on electronic monitoring. They also judged that monitoring could have been used more effectively or creatively in 29% of the cases reviewed.
These percentages refer to the cases inspected, not every electronic-monitoring case nationally.
The findings suggest that the question is not simply whether a tag has been fitted. It is whether the decision to use it is justified, whether the conditions are clear, and whether the information it generates is used effectively.
Expansion brings both opportunities and risks
Electronic monitoring is becoming more prominent in the criminal justice system. The joint inspection reported that the number of people assigned electronic-monitoring equipment increased from 25,533 on 30 June 2025 to 27,847 on 30 June 2026.
That is an increase of more than 2,300 people over the year.
The inspection also highlighted the expected impact of the Sentencing Act 2026 and associated changes on the future use of electronic monitoring.
There are potential benefits to using technology appropriately. It can help enforce certain conditions, provide information relevant to risk management and support some approaches to supervision in the community.
But increased use also brings practical requirements. Agencies need reliable data, clear responsibilities, suitable training, effective information-sharing and enough capacity to respond to alerts.
The NAO warned that the system was not yet operating as intended, while the new joint inspection found that significant weaknesses identified in an earlier inspection remained evident.
This is why expansion should be accompanied by evidence of improvement. The number of devices in use is a measure of scale, not proof of effectiveness.
The relevant question is whether the system can reliably deliver the purpose for which each monitoring condition was imposed.
What needs to improve?
The joint inspection made 30 recommendations to the National Police Chiefs’ Council, chief constables, the Ministry of Justice and HM Prison and Probation Service.
The recommendations address areas including guidance, risk assessment, information-sharing, victim communication and data quality.
Based on the inspection findings, several practical questions deserve continued scrutiny:
- Can the authorities establish a reliable, up-to-date record of who should be monitored, who is being monitored and why any case remains outstanding?
- Are tags being fitted and activated promptly when required?
- Is monitoring information accurate, accessible and shared with the right people?
- Are alleged breaches being assessed consistently, with appropriate consideration of victim safety and public protection?
- Are victims being kept informed when decisions affect relevant bail conditions?
- Are probation practitioners able to use monitoring information effectively in supervision and rehabilitation?
- Can the Government demonstrate that the system is becoming more reliable as demand increases?
These questions provide a basis for assessing progress against the recommendations. They do not assume that every problem has the same cause or that one change will resolve all the weaknesses identified.
Our conclusion: technology is only part of the solution
The evidence does not support the claim that electronic monitoring is inherently ineffective. The inspectors recognised dedicated staff, improved regional oversight and the potential for technology to support public protection and rehabilitation.
But the evidence does raise serious questions about the systems around the technology.
The National Audit Office identified weaknesses in resilience, data quality and performance oversight. The new joint inspection found gaps in guidance, information-sharing, police responses, victim communication and the integration of monitoring into probation practice. It also reported that 5,043 people who should have been monitored were not being monitored on 30 June 2026, while making clear that this group included different circumstances and should not be treated as a count of deliberate evasion.
These findings point to a straightforward principle: a tag is not a guarantee of safety.
Effective electronic monitoring depends on the right equipment being used for the right purpose, reliable information reaching the right people, and agencies having the capacity and procedures to respond appropriately.
As electronic monitoring becomes more widely used, the Government and the responsible agencies must demonstrate that the system is reliable, proportionate and properly integrated into supervision.
The public deserves transparent information about what monitoring can achieve, where it falls short and what is being done to address those weaknesses. Victims deserve clear communication and appropriate safeguards. People subject to monitoring also deserve a system that applies conditions fairly and accurately.
The debate should therefore move beyond how many tags are being issued. The more important question is whether the whole system is delivering the outcomes it is supposed to deliver.
Our investigation will continue. In Part 5, we will examine the wider choices facing the justice system: building more prison capacity, changing sentencing and release policy, or investing in alternatives and what the evidence says about the consequences of each approach.
Sources and further reading
The article draws primarily on official inspections and government statistics. The links below allow readers to examine the original evidence.
Editorial note: Figures in this article relate to the dates, definitions and populations specified by their sources. Findings from inspected cases are not presented as national rates. An alleged breach is not automatically proof of a criminal offence, and the number of people not being monitored should not be interpreted as a count of deliberate tag tampering or absconding.
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