PROBATION UNDER PRESSURE: CAN BRITAIN SAFELY SUPERVISE MORE OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY?
Part 3 of our national investigation into early prisoner release, public protection and the pressures facing the criminal justice system.
Catch a Thief UK | National Justice Series
When someone leaves prison, public attention often focuses on the decision to release them. But what happens next is just as important.
For many people leaving custody, the next stage involves supervision in the community by the Probation Service. Its responsibilities can include monitoring compliance with licence conditions, assessing risks, supporting rehabilitation and taking action when someone’s behaviour raises concerns.
That raises an important question: can a service already struggling with staffing shortages and excessive workloads safely manage its existing responsibilities while preparing for additional demands?
Official audits, parliamentary scrutiny and the Government’s own workforce figures reveal a service facing significant challenges. Recruitment is bringing more people into the wider workforce, and ministers have promised substantial additional investment. However, the latest available evidence also shows that important staffing gaps and performance concerns remain.
This is not simply an employment dispute. It is a question about how effectively the criminal justice system can supervise people in the community, support rehabilitation and protect the public.
How we got here: the first two articles
This investigation is examining early prisoner release from several angles. Each article looks at a different part of the system, because prison capacity, release arrangements and community supervision cannot sensibly be considered in isolation.
Our opening article examined whether releasing prisoners earlier is a sustainable answer to pressure on prison places, or whether it risks transferring some of that pressure from prisons to other parts of the justice system.
The second article examined licence breaches, recalls to custody and electronic monitoring. It highlighted the importance of distinguishing a breach of licence conditions from further offending, and an allegation from a conviction. It also examined wider concerns about electronic monitoring without assuming that every recorded monitoring problem involved someone released under the latest arrangements.
A key limitation remains: the wider statistics do not automatically tell us how many people released under a particular scheme subsequently breached their conditions or reoffended.
Article 3: Probation under pressure
This instalment examines the service expected to supervise people in the community. If the Government intends to make greater use of community sentences and release arrangements that require supervision outside prison, the capacity of probation becomes an essential part of the discussion.
The question is not whether every person released from prison presents a danger. They do not. The question is whether the system has sufficient trained staff, reliable assessments and effective supervision to manage different levels of risk appropriately.
The official warning: a service under strain
One of the most significant assessments comes from the National Audit Office (NAO), the independent body that scrutinises public spending and government performance.
Its report, Building an effective and resilient Probation Service, published in October 2025, examined the reasons for poor performance, staffing pressures and the Government’s plans to make the service more resilient.
The NAO concluded that the Probation Service had remained under significant strain following its unification under public control in June 2021. It found substantial staffing shortfalls, high workloads and continuing performance problems, particularly among qualified probation officers.
The report also explained that the service had been operating with around half the staff needed for sentence management as intended, according to HMPPS’s own analysis of the time required to complete those tasks.
That finding requires context. It does not mean that half of all probation staff were missing, or that every individual case was receiving only half the necessary attention. It reflects the difference between the staffing available and the workforce requirements calculated for sentence management under the revised workload estimates.
Nevertheless, it raises serious questions about whether the service can consistently deliver the level of supervision and risk management expected of it.
Risk assessments: a finding that cannot be ignored
One of the most concerning findings in the NAO and parliamentary evidence relates to the quality of risk-of-harm assessments.
The NAO reported that, in 2024, probation practitioners adequately assessed risk of harm in 28% of the cases examined, compared with 60% in 2018–19.
This is a measure of assessment quality in the cases examined. It does not mean that 72% of people on probation were dangerous, that 72% went on to cause harm, or that every assessment judged inadequate led to a serious incident.
However, risk assessments are central to probation work. They help practitioners determine what supervision is appropriate, identify potential warning signs and decide when intervention may be needed.
If assessments are not consistently meeting the required standard, the implications deserve serious examination. The challenge for the service is to identify risk accurately and proportionately, rather than treating everyone under supervision as equally dangerous or assuming that someone assessed as lower risk can never present a changing risk.
The figures also underline why staffing levels cannot be considered in isolation from professional experience, training, supervision and the time available to complete complex work.
Parliament raises further concerns
The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee examined probation performance and resilience in its report published on 4 February 2026.
The committee found that HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) met only seven of its 27 targets in 2024–25, approximately 26%.
It also scrutinised the relationship between staffing pressures, service performance and public protection. Its findings reinforced concerns that the Probation Service was struggling to deliver consistently against its responsibilities.
The committee’s work is particularly relevant because it examines not only what the Government says it intends to do, but also whether the department understands the scale of the problem and has credible plans to address it.
The NAO and the parliamentary committee are not trade unions. Their findings provide independent scrutiny of the service’s performance and the Government’s response.
That distinction matters in a debate where claims about risk, staffing and public safety can easily become politicised.
The staffing gap: recruitment is improving some areas, but the problem has not disappeared
The Ministry of Justice’s workforce statistics for 30 June 2026 provide a more recent picture of staffing.
The department reported:
- 22,133 full-time equivalent staff across the Probation Service as a whole.
- 5,465 full-time equivalent band 4 probation officers in post.
- 5,924 full-time equivalent band 3 probation services officers in post.
- An increase of 1,310 full-time equivalent staff across the Probation Service over the preceding year, a rise of 6.3%.
- A shortfall of 1,935 full-time equivalent probation officers against the target staffing level of 7,380 reported in the workforce release.
These categories are not interchangeable. The total Probation Service workforce includes a range of roles, while probation officers and probation services officers have different responsibilities and training requirements.
The figures show that recruitment has increased staffing across the service. They also show that the number of qualified probation officers remained below the department’s target.
The Ministry of Justice said it had committed to onboarding at least 1,300 trainee probation officers during the 2026–27 financial year. The department stated that it would confirm whether it had met that commitment in its April 2027 transparency release.
That is a commitment to be assessed against future results, rather than a completed recruitment target.
New trainees can make an important contribution, but recruitment alone does not instantly create an experienced workforce. Training, qualification, retention and the distribution of staff across regions all affect the service’s ability to manage its workload.
Workloads above measured capacity
The NAO found that probation officers were operating at an average of 118% of measured workload capacity between January 2022 and April 2024, with some regions reaching 126%.
These figures should not be interpreted as a simple measure of the hours an individual works each day. They compare estimated workloads with the service’s calculated capacity.
The NAO also warned that earlier calculations underestimated the time needed to complete tasks. This matters because a workload model can make a service appear more adequately staffed than it is if the time required for essential work has been underestimated.
HMPPS subsequently revised its estimates. In July 2025, it estimated a shortfall of approximately 3,150 full-time equivalent staff against a target of around 15,000 sentence-management staff for 2026–27, after accounting for planned recruitment and measures intended to reduce workloads.
This was a revised estimate, not a headcount of vacant jobs across every part of probation. It related to the capacity required for sentence management under the department’s updated modelling.
The broader issue is clear: recruitment, workload reduction and service reform need to work together. If the amount of work required remains greater than the capacity available, adding staff may not be enough to resolve the problem quickly.
Is reducing supervision the answer?
The Government has introduced measures intended to prioritise probation resources and reduce workloads.
The NAO examined measures including Probation Reset, introduced in April 2024, and the Impact scheme, introduced in April 2025. These approaches were intended to focus resources differently, including by reducing some supervision and rehabilitative activity for certain people so that staff could concentrate on higher-priority cases.
The Government’s wider Our Future Probation Service programme aims to release 25% of operational capacity through changes that include digital tools, process improvements and changes to the scope of activities. The programme is intended to help bring the service into balance by April 2027.
There is a legitimate argument for directing more intensive supervision towards people assessed as presenting greater risks. Resources are finite, and a proportionate approach can help staff focus their time where it may have the greatest impact.
But reducing supervision is not automatically a success. It must be supported by sound risk assessments, clear safeguards and evidence that the changes are not creating unacceptable risks elsewhere in the justice system.
The NAO warned that the reforms were ambitious and that the scale of the capacity gap, the pace of change and the reduction in some probation activities created risks for public protection and rehabilitation.
The important question is therefore not simply whether the Government can reduce the number of tasks probation staff undertake. It is whether the service can make those changes without undermining its core responsibilities.
Early release, community sentences and electronic monitoring
This is where the probation debate connects directly to the first two articles in our series.
When prison places are under pressure, governments may seek to make greater use of community sentences, rehabilitation outside prison and changes to release arrangements. Those approaches can form part of a functioning justice system, but they depend on effective supervision where supervision is required.
The NAO warned that planned changes to sentencing intended to address prison capacity would increase demand on the Probation Service.
That does not establish that a particular early-release scheme has caused a specific number of probation failures. To make that claim, we would need reliable data identifying the relevant release cohort and tracking its outcomes.
It does, however, make probation capacity an essential part of evaluating changes to imprisonment and release policy.
Electronic monitoring is also relevant, but a tag is not a substitute for a probation officer. Monitoring can provide information about location or compliance with particular conditions, depending on the technology and order in use. It cannot independently provide all the assessment, professional judgement, rehabilitation and intervention involved in probation supervision.
Article 2 examined concerns about licence breaches, recalls and monitoring failures. In this article, the focus is broader: whether the people and systems responsible for responding to risks have the capacity to do so effectively.
What is the Government investing?
The Government has announced up to £700 million in additional investment for probation and community services by 2028–29.
The investment is intended to support improvements in probation, including workforce and operational capacity, alongside wider measures involving electronic monitoring and other community-based services.
The Government can point to the growth in overall Probation Service staffing over the year to June 2026 and its planned recruitment of trainee probation officers.
Those commitments should be taken seriously. They are relevant evidence of the Government’s intended response, and it would be inaccurate to suggest that no action is being taken.
However, three distinctions are important.
First, a funding commitment is not the same as money already spent or a service improvement already achieved.
Second, trainees are not all immediately available as qualified, experienced probation officers.
Third, recruitment numbers alone cannot establish whether workloads are manageable or whether the quality of supervision is improving.
The NAO and Public Accounts Committee have called attention to the scale of the capacity problem and the need to manage the risks associated with reform. The real test will be whether future staffing figures, inspection findings and performance measures show a sustained improvement.
Probation staff warn of a service under pressure
Napo, the trade union representing probation staff, has raised concerns about excessive workloads, staff shortages, burnout and reliance on overtime.
The union argues that staff need manageable caseloads, better retention and improved working conditions to supervise people effectively and protect the public.
Its concerns are relevant to the debate, but they should be understood as the union’s position rather than treated as independent proof that a particular case has been mishandled.
There is, however, important context: the NAO and parliamentary committee have independently documented staffing shortages, workload pressures and poor performance. The wider concerns about probation capacity therefore do not rest solely on union statements.
Napo has also argued that recruitment alone will not resolve the problem if experienced staff continue to leave or if working conditions make retention difficult.
That raises a practical question for the Government: how will it ensure that new recruits remain in the service and develop the experience needed to handle complex cases?
Industrial action: what is confirmed?
The dispute has moved beyond general expressions of concern.
Napo announced that its negotiating committee had rejected a conditional 5% “best and final” pay offer and that a formal ballot on industrial action over pay and workloads would begin on 19 October 2026.
The union said the offer fell short of its 12% pay claim and raised concerns about conditions attached to pay progression.
An earlier *indicative ballot* reported that 90.76% of votes cast were in favour of potential industrial action. This was not the same as the formal ballot.
At the time of writing, we have not verified a published result for the formal ballot. We therefore cannot responsibly state that the formal ballot has resulted in a mandate for strike action.
The distinction is important. A union announcing a ballot, members voting in an indicative ballot, and a formal ballot producing a legally effective mandate are separate stages.
Any subsequent result should be checked against an official union announcement before publication or update.
What does the Government say?
The Ministry of Justice has previously said it is committed to working with unions and has pointed to its planned £700 million investment in probation and community services, alongside recruitment and wider reform.
That response is relevant, but it should not be confused with proof that the problems identified by auditors have been resolved.
A fair assessment must recognise both sides: the Government has announced investment and measures intended to improve capacity, while independent scrutiny has identified serious problems that require sustained action.
The test is whether those measures produce better staffing levels, manageable workloads, stronger risk assessments and improved outcomes for people supervised in the community.
The cost of getting it wrong
The NAO cites Ministry of Justice estimates that reoffending costs society around £20.9 billion a year in 2024–25 prices.
This is an estimate of the wider social and economic cost of reoffending. It is not a figure that can be attributed solely to probation, and it does not mean every improvement in probation would produce an equivalent saving.
Nevertheless, it illustrates why rehabilitation and effective supervision matter beyond the immediate criminal justice system.
When supervision works well, it can help people comply with sentences, address the factors contributing to offending and reduce the likelihood of further crime. When a service lacks the capacity to deliver essential work, the consequences may affect victims, families, communities and the public purse.
That is why probation should not be treated as an afterthought in decisions about prison capacity and release policy. It is a central part of the system.
What should the public expect next?
The evidence raises questions that deserve clear answers from the Government and HMPPS:
- Are qualified probation officer numbers increasing quickly enough to meet the department’s staffing requirements?
- Are workload calculations accurately reflecting the time needed to manage cases safely?
- Are risk assessments and inspection findings improving?
- Can the Government demonstrate that reduced supervision is being applied appropriately and that safeguards are working?
- How will the £700 million investment be allocated, and what measurable improvements will it deliver?
- What data will allow the public to distinguish the outcomes of particular early-release arrangements from wider probation performance?
These questions do not require the public to take a position for or against prison release reforms in advance. They require transparent reporting, measurable objectives and evidence that the system can carry out the responsibilities assigned to it.
Our conclusion: release policy and probation capacity must be considered together
The evidence does not support the simplistic claim that every person released early will reoffend or that probation staff are unable to supervise anyone safely.
It does support a more serious conclusion: England and Wales have a documented probation capacity problem, and the Government must demonstrate that its recruitment and reform plans are improving the service’s ability to manage risk and support rehabilitation.
The National Audit Office has identified significant staffing and workload pressures. Parliament has scrutinised persistent performance problems. The latest workforce figures show growth across the service, but also a continuing shortfall in qualified probation officers against the stated target.
The Government has committed funding and further recruitment. Those commitments provide a route towards improvement, but the outcome must be judged by delivery rather than announcements.
This is why the first three articles in our investigation belong together.
Prison overcrowding is one part of the problem. Release arrangements and compliance with licence conditions are another. The capacity of probation to supervise people in the community is a third.
A policy cannot be judged solely by how many prison places it frees. It must also be assessed against the ability of the wider justice system to manage the consequences safely and effectively.
For victims and the public, the essential question is not whether every offender should be treated identically. It is whether decisions are based on reliable assessments, whether conditions are enforced appropriately, and whether the service responsible for supervision has the resources and experience to do its job.
In the next instalment, we will examine electronic tagging: what it can monitor, what it cannot do, and whether the technology is providing the safeguards the public has been led to expect.
Sources and further reading
The following links provide the primary evidence and reporting used in this article:
Editorial note: Statistics in this article relate to the dates and populations specified by the cited sources. Wider probation figures should not be interpreted as outcomes attributable solely to the October 2026 early-release arrangements. The formal industrial-action ballot result was not verified at the time of writing.
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